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This essay develops James Lenman’s view that ‘‘moral inquiry is politics.’’1 Unlike
empirical investigation, moral inquiry is not connected with a domain of facts that
exist independently of the inquiry and help explain its success. It is outward looking
– your thought that slavery is wrong is not a thought about you – but confident moral
beliefs are not best understood as receptivity to moral aspects of the world. Rather,
they come from successfully negotiating, constructing and sustaining the rules of a
moral community. Lenman’s picture entails an expressivist approach to moral
philosophy in contrast to moral realism, but it also exhibits cognitively ample forms
of approval and disapproval that expressivists have not very fully explored.
In order to frame the cognitive richness of practical deliberation, the first part of
this discussion sets out important metaethical parameters. In particular it surveys
differences between semantic and epistemic conceptions of truth in connection with
determining and justifying reasons for belief. They suggest a case for saying that
when philosophers speak of normative truth they can only demonstrate reasonable-
ness. The second part of the discussion supports this case by displaying the
advantages of focussing upon reasonableness. It supports locating a cognitivist
expressivism between the extremes of normative realism and non-cognitivism
where the weaknesses of standard expressivism can be avoided. The benefits include
better understanding and potentially addressing many of the ethical and political
issues that arise in morally engaged societies. Practical inquiry is inherently subject
to disputes that go unsettled, making it dubious that ‘‘We may, and must, assume
our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct.’’2 By preferring to make
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reasonable choices instead of seeking truth for purposes of action we can move
beyond sectarian divisions to a kind of moral collaboration.
1 Truth and Reasonableness
Following Lenman, let us call normative beliefs ‘‘intuitions’’ in broad contrast to
beliefs that arise from factual observation. These observational beliefs define terrain
on which truth is indispensable for sound practical reasoning. True beliefs about
means to ends anchor the conceptual framework of instrumental rationality and
deliberations leading to effective social policy and personal success. In this respect
the truth is essential for reasoning in which an agent formulates plans and makes
decisions, but these practical concerns contrast with normatively ambitious
extensions of truth that go beyond the clear results of observation to the ideals
and aspirations that explain the value placed upon public and private objectives. The
resistance of such normative matters to factual demonstration is typical of moral and
political intuition, making it difficult to speak convincingly about normative
knowledge of them.
Most of the relevant properties of intuition are well illustrated by our emotional
responses to things, such as fear of conflict or hopes for reform. ‘‘Emotivism’’ was a
brand name for 20th Century non-cognitivists, but cognition is complex. It
encompasses both the sentient behavior in animals that negotiate their surroundings
intelligently and the sapient actions of human beings who respond rationally to their
environment. Sentience is the biological phenomenon that distinguishes conscious
awareness from the responses of thermostats. Sapience is the quality characteristic
of rational animals that display grasp of propositional content and inference.3
Emotional thinking is neither simply sentient nor ideally rational, marking ground
between these modes of awareness that should be open to explication by a form of
cognitivist emotivism or expressivism. This ground, we may expect, will not display
a sharp division between beliefs and other mental states that should fit the world and
those, such as desires, that we are motivated to make the world fit.4 In order to be
tenable, in other words, expressivism will have to reject a dichotomy between
cognitive and conative states.
If this dichotomy is rejected it seems best to construe ‘‘belief’’ not as the name of
a distinct psychological state but as a generic term for keeping track of
commitments within a discourse.5 These commitments include logical sensitivity
to patterns of valid inference, but ‘‘belief’’ is a broad term of art that covers mental
pictures and emotional responses as well as propositional attitudes. So understood,
in feeling fear one believes oneself endangered even if one also believes that there is
no serious chance of harm. Such awkward intuitions lead some to speak in other
3 Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 4–6.
4 This point is critically developed by Bennett W. Helm, Love, Friendship, and the Self (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp. 7 and 55–56.
5 This characterization follows Neil Sinclair, ‘‘Propositional Clothing and Belief,’’ The Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 57, no. 228, 2007, p. 253.
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ways,6 but there is no contradiction here: it is perfectly possible to believe oneself in
danger while realizing that one’s fear is unfounded in that it lacks the normal
determining reasons for the emotion. Speaking of beliefs has the benefit of calling
attention to the fact that there are deliberative resources for dealing with the
awkward emotional commitment, leading the inappropriate feeling to be addressed
by recognition that no real harm threatens. ‘‘Belief’’ marks the difference between
considered intuitions and recalcitrant illusions, intuitions being less independent
from higher cognitive processes than the persistent Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion, for
example. To be sure, it takes time and effort to train oneself out of a phobic belief.
Practical deliberation may remain indecisive, leaving conflicts within as well as
between individuals, but this is a constitutional liability of agents who are intuitive
as well as rational beings.
The psychological latitude of beliefs can also be usefully illustrated by our
thinking about the various institutional proprieties that give people a place in the
conventional realities that shape orderly social relationships. Thus, people count as
spouses under established procedures of marriage that confer certain rights and
obligations upon two partners. These institutional realities are usually very fact-like,
providing clear objects of true belief. Sometimes, however, moral and political
issues arise that call the desirability of particular institutions into question. When
exclusively heterosexual marriage became contested, beliefs about spouses began to
display a desire-like dimension not previously so apparent. Of course, one might
insist that the distinction between beliefs and desires remains perfectly clear. There
are beliefs about spouses: for example, only relationships between men and women
count as marriages. And there are desires: for example, one wishes that there be
institutional change, or that there not be. However, explicating the belief about
spousal relationships requires an account of who is doing the counting. The
institutional fact comes to something like this: let us only count relationships
between men and women as marriages. Such counting-as is an act of volition. It is
already the expression of desire, and where desires conflict the facts become open to
negotiation.
As the hard facts of the matter become correspondingly less evident in such
cases, two contrasting conceptual options suggest themselves. One is chosen by
Joshua Cohen, who pursues an expansive role for truth: The ‘‘political truth’’ of
hopes and ideals cannot be put aside ‘‘while preserving notions of belief, assertion,
judgment, reason and objectivity, all of which are essential to an idea of public
reason.’’ Moral and political claims ‘‘must be truth-apt… if there is to be a common
ground of argument under conditions of doctrinal disagreement.’’7 These imper-
atives are not obviously valid, however, if some reasoning is a matter of emotional
reasonableness, for which there need not be a truth to be discovered or a proposition
to be proved. It is enough for reasonableness that moral and political beliefs are
6 E.g., Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 39–40; and
Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, ‘‘The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or Anti-quasijudg-
mentalism),’’ in Anthony Hatzimoysis, ed., Philosophy and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), pp. 127–145.




supported by thoughtful deliberation.8 One’s positions should not be reached
arbitrarily but include concern for reasoning even if they express intuitions whose
justifying reasons defy full factual demonstration. Pursuing this option will promote
a narrow role for truth by displaying reasonableness as a distinctive virtue of
practical reasoning that is capable of accommodating argument, assertion,
judgment, etc.
The other option for truth is to multiply its role rather than to expand it. This
suggestion emerges naturally from Eugene Garver’s point that to be part of a moral
community is to have one’s stories heard. To think of these accounts only as forms
of self-expression rather than statements of truth, he maintains, would fail to take
them seriously enough. The better alternative is to accept ‘‘multiple truths’’ or ‘‘a
diversity of truths,’’ corresponding to incommensurable personal and communal
narratives.9 Although there is much appealing in this idea, it describes reasonable-
ness better than it describes truth. Reasonableness is plural. We recognize that there
may be a variety of reasonable opinions about many matters, especially in the
ambiguous situations of emotional conflict and moral difficulty that novelists and
playwrights help us understand. Truth, by contrast, is singular. The truth about
something is like the most reasonable position concerning it and may prove to be an
unobtainable ideal as we assert and argue in defence of our different reasonable
judgments. In the case of emotional intuitions that ideal may also prove illusory.
Classical emotivism was principally a theory about moral beliefs, but these
beliefs have a more general form. Fear has already been offered as a simple model.
Like other emotions fear has both determining and justifying reasons. Its
determining reasons are the perceived properties that normally evoke the emotion,
such as anticipated loss or injury. (The qualification, ‘‘normally,’’ is necessary
because of cases in which the perception of loss or injury is met impassively or even
joyously: determining reasons are defeasible.) The typical conditions of determining
reasons are descriptive properties: Loss and injury are verifiable facts when they
occur. They stand in contrast to the justifying properties that make things not only
feared but fearful. These things are dangers. They are inherently fear-worthy, but
they are not verifiable in the same way. Whether a loss is worthy of fear can always
be contested. As Martin Luther said of temporal threats, ‘‘Take they our life, goods,
fame, child and wife … they yet have nothing won.’’10 Whether these undoubted
losses should be feared is a matter for deliberation because the determining reason
for fear provides no conclusive answer. The possibility of coherently wondering
whether bodily injury is worth fearing shows how people can reasonably differ
about the things they identify as dangers and thus as to be feared. It is an otiose
hypothesis that there is nevertheless a truth of the matter.
8 The point is nicely developed by David Enoch, ‘‘An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative
Realism,’’ Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 2007, pp. 34–38, and by Bennett W. Helm, Emotional Reason:
Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
pp. 200–201.
9 Eugene Garver, For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of Belief
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 17–18.
10 Martin Luther, ‘‘A Mighty Fortress.’’ Compare Shakespeare’s ‘‘Who Steals My Purse Steals Trash,’’
Othello III, iii, 157.
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Developing this dual-reasons model and extending it to moral and political
beliefs will show why aiming at the truth is appropriate for beliefs concerning the
determining reasons of the relevant emotions, whereas aiming for reasonableness is
appropriate for beliefs about their justifying reasons. Explicating the point will also
display contrasts between reasonableness and rationality. Both are exercises of
reasoned deliberation but reasonableness is more permissive, departing from
‘‘‘Rational Uniqueness,’ the view that there is a unique maximally epistemically
rational response to any given evidential situation.’’11 Reasonableness does not
decisively depend upon what can be known in the same way, since questions of
emotion-worthiness may remain open when there is agreement on all the facts. The
point leads to interesting and important questions about the nature of intuitions, one
of which (the combination of desire-like and belief-like elements) is addressed in
the next section. A prior task is to set out more fully how reasonableness is
amenable to a cognitivist expressivism that lies between robust moral realism and
non-cognitivism.
Robust moral realism holds that moral beliefs are epistemically truth-apt. The
common feature of this family of theories is that one can seriously quest after moral
knowledge, expecting the truth to sometimes be obtainable.12 Realism in this sense
is distinct from ‘‘error theory,’’ which accepts the idea of moral beliefs as truth-apt
but regards them as uniformly false. It is also distinct from theories that postulate
moral truths but do not require them to be discoverable. A special case of the latter
kind is the family of views that regard normative beliefs as semantically truth-apt in
contrast to making epistemic claims. This distinction is explained further below, but
it will be useful first to contrast non-realistic cognitivism with non-cognitivism, the
latter consisting of three related views: Moral judgments of the form ‘‘X is wrong’’
or ‘‘X is good’’ express attitudes of approval or disapproval towards their subjects;
moral terms have a different sort of meaning from the descriptive terms used to state
ordinary matters of fact, such as the truth that grass is green; and moral claims lack
truth conditions.13
Non-cognitivism is aptly named, since there is no clear room for the
reasonableness of moral claims here. If the disapproval conveyed by ‘‘Slavery is
wrong,’’ for example, were an expression of mere disapproval no scope would be
available for deliberation. Typically, though, the sentence does not express simple
disapproval. Rather, it reflects a view of slavery as warranting moral hatred or
indignation in virtue of various facts of human trafficking. However, hating slavery
for these determining reasons does not yet show it to be morally offensive. That
comes with the further perception that hatred or righteous indignation is justified by
violations of human equality or dignity. The justifying reason identifies slavery as
worthy of disapproval on explicitly moral grounds. A natural gloss on sentences
11 David Christensen, ‘‘Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,’’ Philosophical Review, vol.
116, no. 2, 2007, p. 210.
12 Some expressivists, such as Blackburn and Gibbard, also postulate moral knowledge. This idea is
critically discussed in a companion to the present article: Cf. Evan Simpson, ‘‘Practical Reasonableness:
Some Epistemic Issues,’’ The Journal of Value Inquiry. doi:10.1007/s10790-013-9367-z.
13 This is Mark Schroeder’s summary, ‘‘Expression for Expressivists,’’ Philosophy and Phenomenolog-
ical Research, vol. 76, no. 1, 2008.
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such as ‘‘Slavery is wrong’’ thus displays typical moral judgments as content-rich
states of mind aroused by ascertainable facts and justified by reasons to protest
toleration of those facts. Of course, because determining reasons for indignant
disapproval do not logically justify the normative assessment, it is still possible to
construe justifying reasons non-cognitively as expressions of desire-like states. The
plausibility of understanding them in this way will be undermined, however, as
intuitions display their capacity to be influenced by argument. They are much more
redolent of judgment than non-cognitivist views typically recognize. Even if the first
defining condition of these views is correct as far as it goes, it omits much of
philosophical interest.
The distinction between determining and justifying reasons also bears upon the
limitations of the second and third conditions of non-cognitivism. One might speak
of the descriptive meaning of determining reasons and the evaluative meaning of
justifying reasons, but the distinction between kinds of meaning does no clear work
that is not already done by the distinction between kinds of reasons. On the one hand
we have factual statements with which any rational person can ultimately be
expected to agree. On the other hand, we have our reasons for hating something
even though what makes something hateful (or whether it is hateful) is not a matter
on which we can always gain agreement and responsibly claim knowledge. If
considering slavery hateful is not justified by reference to a demonstrable reality,
then differences of moral and political belief have to be managed through
reasonable deliberation. It is this concept rather than meaning that requires further
explication, and because that account will include the role of determining properties
the third defining condition of non-cognitivism also has to be qualified. Our reasons
for hating slavery and believing it hateful may depend upon believing it to be truly
painful or injurious. Beliefs about the determining factors of our emotional
responses do aim at truth. It is the reasonableness of differing justifying beliefs
where there is no disagreement about the describable facts that needs more
attention.
A serious issue about the reasonableness of justifying beliefs concerns the idea
that truth or something like truth is a semantic virtue of normative claims.14
Although non-cognitivism excludes the truth of justifying reasons, many contem-
porary expressivists accept it as a consequence of the logical platitude that p is true
if and only if p.15 Any intelligible proposition is then semantically truth-apt, so that
in reasonably assenting to ‘‘Slavery is wrong’’ one thereby accepts the truth of that
sentence. In other words, any commitment to p includes commitment to the truth of
p, even if in only a minimal sense for which it has no further analysis or
14 The qualification, ‘‘something like truth’’ may address discomfort in claiming truth for ‘‘slavery is
wrong’’ by employing a word for ascriptive success that means ‘‘valid, or sound, or some such thing.’’ See
David Estlund, ‘‘The Insularity of the Reasonable: Why Political Liberalism Must Admit the Truth,’’
Ethics, vol. 108, no. 2, 1998, p. 274. Ju¨rgen Habermas similarly proposes an analogy between rightness
and truth in Truth and Justification (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 270–271.
15 E.g., Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, ‘‘Cognitivist Expressivism,’’ in Horgan and Timmons, eds.,
Metaethics After Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). They suggest that truth ascriptions to
moral statements are ‘‘morally engaged semantic appraisals… in which semantic evaluation is ‘fused’
with moral evaluation’’ (p. 275). This metaphorical move should be unnecessary when one deploys the
resources provided by reasonableness.
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metaphysical backing, such as correspondence to the facts. To say that a moral or
political belief is true is therefore not to say that it is an object of knowledge,
divorcing the semantic conception from epistemic issues.16 Hence, in many matters
of practical interest, matters of justifying reasons in particular, striving to be
reasonable need not be encumbered by metaphysical debate. It is one thing to
recognize that deliberating about practical issues includes committing oneself ‘‘to
there being reasons for one’s positions.’’ It is quite another thing to add, ‘‘and so to
their normative truth.’’17 Enoch makes this inference to the epistemic conception,
thinking it essential for taking morality seriously, but this thought is superfluous as
long as the reasonableness of justifying beliefs serves the same purpose.
It is also possible to avoid entanglement in the metaphysics of propositions.
Moral beliefs can be conveyed in propositional clothing or propositional guise even
if they are not taken as interestingly true.18 To be sure, ‘‘we call something a
proposition when … we apply the calculus of truth functions to it.’’19 Non-
cognitivism therefore proposed a plethora of analyses of sentences outside this
range, urging caution about assuming that thoughts expressed propositionally are
always philosophically perspicuous. Various indicative sentences, including those
of the sort ‘‘Slavery is wrong,’’ might then be set outside any form of words to
which the predicate ‘‘true’’ properly attaches. Nonetheless, declining the proposi-
tional gambit is unnecessary if Mark Schroeder’s divorce of two roles for
propositions succeeds. In one role, they are ‘‘the objects of attitudes like belief,
desire, and assertion, and the bearers of truth and falsity.’’ In the other, they ‘‘play a
role in carving up the world at its joints, are associated with metaphysical
commitment, and are the appropriate objects of excluded middle.’’20 Objects of the
first sort do not entail a philosophically weighty commitment to the epistemic truth
of moral and political beliefs – that is, to moral and political knowledge – again
warranting stress upon reasonableness over truth.
Of course, the strategy of metaphysical avoidance will fail if the epistemic truth
of our justifying reasons is particularly important to us. This would be the case if
confident moral beliefs required people to not only ‘‘assert their commitments in an
unqualified way’’ but also ‘‘insist on the correctness of such judgments for all.’’21
However, the evidence is not very compelling for supposing that people do insist
16 Whether a solely semantic conception of truth can be sustained is open to question because the shadow
of metaphysical content is difficult to expunge entirely. James Dreier, ‘‘Meta-ethics and the Problem of
Creeping Minimalism,’’ Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 1, 2004, provides an authoritative
statement of the issue.
17 David Enoch, ‘‘Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism,’’ p. 39 and p. 47, and
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 75.
18 The notion of propositional guises (including normative utterances as ‘‘secondary propositionalized
transformations’’ of normative stances) is elaborated by Michael Pendlebury, ‘‘How to be a Normative
Expressivist,’’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 80, no. 1, 2010. Proposition-talk can
also be considered an exercise in semantic pretense or make-believe. Cf. Bradley Armour-Garb and James
A. Woodbridge, ‘‘The Story About Propositions,’’ Nouˆs, vol. 46, no. 4, 2012.
19 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), section 135.
20 Mark Schroeder, ‘‘Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce?,’’ Nouˆs, vol. 47, no. 3, 2013,
p. 410.
21 Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), p. 32.
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upon something like truth and knowledge for their moral claims. It may well be that
we begin as pre-theoretical realists, but that changes with learning. Although young
children have not yet begun to differentiate between truth and reasonableness, the
appearance of common-sense objectivity dissipates as they become deliberative
agents, recognize the contestability of their intuitions, and begin to distinguish the
determining from the justifying reasons for these judgments.22 To be sure, some
philosophers pronounce the truth of their moral faith, but it is far from clear that
such robust objective pretentions are part of the basic phenomenology of moral
feelings or ordinary moral discourse.23 The aspirations and commitments of
ordinary moral judgment need not extend beyond their reasonableness to their
epistemic truth-aptness. In contrast to ‘‘Slavery is wrong,’’ with which we expect
reasonable people in a liberal society to concur, we may comprehensibly hesitate to
say, ‘‘It is true that slavery is wrong’’ unless we wish to make an anodyne semantic
point or recognize an example of special declarative language whose most famous
example is, ‘‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal.…’’24 There is, in short, a prima facie case for supposing that distinctively
moral and political deliberation and judgment insist less upon truth than upon
reasonableness.
2 Cognitivist Expressivism
In order to develop this case, it will be useful to set out a challenge that it must
ultimately satisfy. One can argue that when people make moral judgments and
engage in moral disputes they express more than the reasonableness of their
positions. After all, when people are confident in their moral opinions they normally
view opposing positions as less well founded than their own. Sometimes this
confidence amounts to thinking that the other positions are unreasonable, but in
some cases people may regard the opposing views as just as reasonable as their own.
In these cases, argument typically continues as people defend their views and try to
show that the other side is somehow mistaken. Reasonableness, therefore, does not
seem sufficient as a criterion of acceptable moral judgment.
Ultimately meeting this challenge will depend upon explicating the cognitive
demands of continuing a morally significant conversation. This is an agenda that
standard forms of expressivism are not well designed to satisfy. These theories
represent normative claims as having a separate descriptive or non-normative
component and a normative component. The descriptive component states the
utterer’s belief about a matter of fact, while the normative component records a
desire-like attitude and supplies the motivational component typical of moral
beliefs. Thus, ‘‘Slavery is wrong’’ indicates that there is something about slavery
22 Compare Shaun Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 166–98.
23 Simon Kirchen also argues generally that ethical phenomenology does not support any metaethical
position over any other: ‘‘Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics,’’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice,
vol. 6, no. 3, 2003.
24 July 4, 1776, Declaration of the Congress of the USA.
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that one disapproves and is inclined to act against. Not everyone who makes this
claim need disapprove of the same thing, so that determining the descriptive
component of one’s claim always deserves examination. It could turn out to be false,
opening up room for rational disagreement. (Such factual errors have been
important in discussions of ethnic intolerance, for example.) In all its standard
versions, however, expressivism limits further argument by regarding the attitudinal
component of intuitive judgment as simply a matter of desires or preferences rather
than more interesting justifying reasons. An inkling of the resulting problem
emerges from the possibility that in condemning slavery we may not only make
different descriptive judgments but also express different disapproving attitudes.
The practice arouses one person’s hatred but another’s indignation, say. The
difference does not easily fit the model of mere preference, since the justifying
reasons for hatred and indignation are different: hatred includes a perception of
evils, whereas indignation includes a perceived violation of rights. Like competing
descriptions, these reasons are subject to discussion and argument, making it
difficult to accept expressivism until it accommodates their reasonableness.
Towards that end, suppose that human equality is called upon to justify extending
certain liberties to everyone or promoting reformed patterns of income and wealth.
At the same time, as part of avoiding the metaphysical entanglements of truths and
propositions, consider the point non-propositionally. Rather than saying that
freedoms and economic means should be similar because human beings are equal,
the discussion of institutional reform may be considered ‘‘prepositionally’’:
freedoms and means should be similar because of human equality.25 This modest
regimentation of ordinary language assists in viewing human equality as an
emotion-expressing rather than truth-representing concept: belief in equality is not a
propositional attitude but commitment to a respectful picture of persons as persons.
The device helps confirm that nothing requires bundling belief and reasonableness
together with truth. Rather, one believes (propositionally) that p if and only if one
believes that p is true, but one may believe prepositionally in something – such as
human equality – without advancing this further belief. Although it is normally
possible to dress an emotional belief in propositional clothing, expressing the belief
prepositionally will prevent issues of truth from dominating discussions of
reasonable political faith or moral conviction. Emotional belief resembles an
intellectual stance, such as progressive preference for human equality over a
conservative preference for recognizing personal distinctions. As such it can be
reasonable as long as it hangs together with one’s other commitments and is
responsive to challenge. If asked, ‘‘You profess belief in human equality, so how
can you justify your personal wealth?’’ a reasonable response could rest upon a set
of life-choices – for example, to be generous to others – rather than upon a set of
truths.
The prepositional rendering of stances and intuitions is consistent with the idea
that emotional thinking is not strictly sapient or rational, but it leaves room for
25 Another version of the suggestion that non-propositional entities may be among the terms of the belief-
relation is offered by Ray Buchanan, ‘‘Is Belief a Propositional Attitude?,’’ Philosophers’ Imprint, vol.
12, no. 1, 2012.
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speaking of reasonableness in a way not easily accommodated within the desire-
plus-belief account of action favored by standard expressivism. On this account,
rational agents search their propositional beliefs for those that identify the best
means for satisfying their desires, but this picture does not well characterize the
intuitions of emotional beings whose reasons exhibit no clear detachment between
belief and desire. Rather, the fearful belief occasioned by a perceived threat is
intimately linked to the fight-or-flight response. Such tendencies are built into
emotional beliefs rather than resulting from desires distinct from them.26 As a result,
emotionally reasonable agents do not simply adopt the means to their desires but
seek to assure themselves that their desires are consonant with good justifying
reasons. If the object feared lacks fear-worthiness, there is a good reason not to flee
even if a true determining reason unreflectively prevails, leading to that action. In
either event, the cognitive demands upon emotion keep the response open to
deliberative review. Emotional beliefs thus have a place for standards of motivation
by which the actions they occasion can be assessed separately from the satisfaction
of desires. One may want to avoid injury, rightly believing flight to promise safety
and act accordingly, but reasonably regret that rational action.
The cognitive demands of this picture are absent from expressivist theories that
have no developed account of reasonable emotions. These theories do have clear
virtues. By attaching normative judgments about slavery to descriptive beliefs about
human trafficking, the judgments can display all the logical properties of descriptive
propositions while exhibiting the action-guiding properties that these propositions
by themselves lack.27 The theories correctly explain that different people may reject
slavery for different reasons. They even explain how one who believes that slaves
are property may not believe slavery to be wrong for want of disapproving the
ownership of other human beings. Moreover, as Michael Ridge shows, these
theories can bridge the gap between cognitivism and expressivism in one important
respect: If cognitivism is the view that normative claims express beliefs rather than
desires and expressivism is the view that normative claims express desires rather
than beliefs, then an ecumenical expressivism can have the best of both worlds:
normative claims express both beliefs and desires.28 However, it is easy to see that
expressivist theories of this kind do not seriously renounce their non-cognitivism,
subscribing uncritically to the assumptions of the belief-desire account of agency.
The cognitive limitations of Ridge’s expressivism initially display themselves in
the absence of a clear distinction between descriptive and determining properties.
The basic account holds that an intuition of something’s moral wrongness consists
of a suitable state of disapproval for a certain descriptive property (or set of
26 In this respect emotional beliefs are examples of the ‘‘besires’’ discussed (though not endorsed) by
Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 118–125. Generically, these beliefs
exemplify what is called motivational internalism.
27 The fusion of semantic and moral evaluation suggested by Horgan and Timmons includes a version of
this account. A comprehensive assessment of such approaches is given by Mark Schroeder in Being For:
Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) and
subsequent articles.
28 Michael Ridge, ‘‘Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?,’’ Oxford Studies in
Metaethics, vol. 2, 2007.
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properties) and a belief ascribing the property to that thing. Strictly construed, this
makes disapproval too unmotivated. The characterization permits supposing that in
believing slavery to be wrong one can hate it in virtue of any of its descriptive
properties, such as lacking provision for vacations. The problem is that hating
something should be done for relevant reasons. Just as one cannot normally fear
rainbows but only things that presage harm, one cannot seriously despise slavery for
arbitrary or insufficient reasons.
At first sight, this deficiency can be addressed through a minor revision. It is only
necessary to restrict the relevant descriptive grounds of disapproval to the
determining reasons for moral hatred, indignation, and the like. This qualification
voids charges of arbitrariness by linking particular emotional responses to the
properties that normally evoke them – causing other persons pain, for example.
Although this is a small revision, however, it brings the deep weakness of non-
cognitivism to the surface. In fearing, hating or responding indignantly to anything
the question appropriately arises whether the determining reasons render their object
fearful, hateful or worthy of indignation. Expressivism is mostly silent about
justifying reasons even in the ‘‘ideal advisor’’ version that Ridge prefers.29 Only
referring to something like cruel pain or the indignity of servitude shows that
slavery is reasonably disapproved because also reasonably deemed to be worthy of
offense. A practice is hated for a determining reason, but its hatefulness depends
upon a justifying reason for which expressivism makes no provision beyond
supposing that justifying reasons are not belief-like but desire-like, resting
ultimately upon preferences that resist examination.
Is this provision perhaps sufficient? The expressivist analysis has seemed
especially plausible for ‘‘thick’’ concepts such as danger because their complex
content can ostensibly be disentangled into separate descriptive and attitudinal
components. Calling something a danger then reflects believing some unwanted loss
to be in the offing. The concepts of virtues and vices are similarly viewed as sets of
describable properties towards which there are typical desires and aversions. The
appropriate response is that such characterizations fail because they neglect the
justifying reasons for responses to describable things. The capacity for meaningful
argument about attitudes towards the facts, in other words, shows that intuitions
about them can be reasonable. Yet standard expressivism has a strong rejoinder to
this response: To call an intuition reasonable is to say that one has a positive attitude
towards the reasons for the belief. Reasonableness, therefore, does not reach
fundamentally beyond the forms of reasoning that one prefers or desires. In other
words, expressivism arguably precludes a cognitivist variant any stronger than
Ridge’s ecumenical hybrid for which normative claims express both beliefs about
matters of describable fact and desires concerning those facts.
Lenman seems to concede the point in speaking of normative judgments as ‘‘a
kind of desire’’ or ‘‘unwillingness … to accept any rules for the regulation of my
community that permit members of that community to murder, rape, torture and so
on.’’ In fact, his discussion warrants the cognitively richer (although still not
‘‘robust’’) reading that runs through his account.
29 Ridge, ‘‘Ecumenical Expressivism,’’ pp. 56–59.
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[W]e deliberate together about what the terms of our moral community should
be… It’s an attempt by us to bring our – and not merely my – moral judgments
into a harmonious state of reflective equilibrium… Moral inquiry is … the
attempt to arrive by co-deliberation at agreement on what might be an
acceptable set of moral standards … an attempt to determine what moral
norms we might … agree in endorsing …, but where by ‘‘determine’’ I mean
not so much discover as settle.30
This conclusion addresses the challenge posed above to cognitivist expressivism.
Argument may continue, but trying to settle disputes is not principally a matter of
correcting mistakes. It is a collaborative practice rather than an effort to demonstrate
one position or refute another. Lenman shows here that there can be common
grounds of agreement without requiring that one’s claims be epistemically truth-apt.
His mode of co-deliberation includes no commitment to normative truth, so that
when philosophers speak of truth it is often only reasonableness that they can
demonstrate.
The challenge then becomes demonstrating even this, or finding a distinctively
cognitivist expressivism free from threats of regress. Expressivism generally
recognizes that ‘‘What standards people accept is influenced by normative
remuneration and normative discussion’’ but still represents the view as ‘‘non-
cognitivistic in the narrow sense that … to call a thing rational is not to state a
matter of fact, either truly or falsely.’’31 A variant that glosses reasonableness in
terms of thoughtful deliberation, sufficient reasons, and the like will in so doing
refer to normative judgments that likewise lack factual determination and robust
truth conditions. Reasonableness then arguably comes to an end in mere preferences
for the arguments we favor. However, this reductive gambit can be resisted by
stressing the importance of the fact that argument does not end. Politics goes on.
The norms of association are challenged and renegotiated as circumstances offer
reasons that test prevailing understandings. Standard expressivism recognizes that
preferences are modified during the course of experience and discussion but
encumbers itself unnecessarily by assuming that normative judgments and the
preferences they display rest upon the desire side of a dichotomy. Keener attention
to the ways in which all judgments can listen to reason should undermine the appeal
of the question-begging distinction between desire-like and belief-like states.
Two features of the standards Lenman refers to are particularly significant for
understanding emotional reasonableness as cognitively demanding. First, these
standards are inherently objective in a clear sense. We are taught what to fear,
whom to trust, when to show respect. Even infantile fears are quickly corrected by
the standards of our communities. Second, there is also a clear sense in which these
standards are not socially relative. They will usually reflect social norms and be
generally accepted within a community but, like institutional facts, they are not
finally authoritative because they can always be politically questioned and
challenged. In disputing elements of public opinion one is often asking why one
30 Lenman, ‘‘What is Moral Inquiry?,’’ pp. 74–75.
31 Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, p. 264 and p. 8.
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should fear X, trust Y or respect Z. Judging these feelings to be warranted
acknowledges well-defined norms of evidence but ones that are never finally
established. On the one hand a coherent emotional life includes recognizing existing
social norms of judgment, but on the other hand emotional maturity includes
recognizing the contestability of the norms that make reasonable intuitions possible.
Such maturity may not come easily outside pluralistic societies in which a
multiplicity of reasonable standards is evident, but all cultures have prophets and
critics whose example displays the variability of defensible norms. In contrast to the
determining reasons and other descriptive beliefs whose truth is decided by the
facts, there is no such definitive decision procedure for intuitions.
3 Conclusion
Yet it would be a mistake to hold that if nothing makes moral beliefs true then there
is nothing other than one’s own attitudes for evaluating competing views. Rather,
when contests of emotional belief arise, discursive deliberation is called for in
contrast to the accurate description that can resolve factual disagreements. Upon
looking closely at practical argumentation, it becomes clear that reasonableness is a
social capacity rather than an assessment of beliefs that fit the world. Ongoing social
discourse can be frustrating because justifying reasons are contestable, but there is
another way of saying this: Reasoning never comes to an end where we are left with
mere preferences. Justifying reasons do not run out in a residue of non-cognitive
attitudes remaining when all argument is over because reasonable discussion is
inherently open to continuation.
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